We consider a class of linear-quadratic-Gaussian mean-field games with a major agent and considerable heterogeneous minor agents in the presence of mean-field interactions. The individual admissible controls are constrained in closed convex subsets Γ k of R m . The decentralized strategies for individual agents and consistency condition system are represented in an unified manner through a class of mean-field forward-backward stochastic differential equations involving projection operators on Γ k . The well-posedness of consistency system is established in both the local and global cases by the contraction mapping and discounting method respectively. Related ε−Nash equilibrium property is also verified.
Introduction
Mean-field games (MFGs) for stochastic large-population systems have been well-studied because of their wide applications in various fields, such as economics, engineering, social sciences, and operational research. Large-population systems are distinguished by a large number of agents (or players), such that the individual influence of any single agent on the overall population is negligible, but the effects of their statistical behaviors cannot be ignored at the population scale. Mathematically, all agents are weakly-coupled in their dynamics or cost functionals through the state-average (in a linear state case) or the general empirical measure (in a nonlinear state case), which characterizes the statistical effect generated by the population from a macroscopic perspective. Because of these features, when the number of agents is sufficiently high, complicated coupling features arise and it is unrealistic for a given agent to obtain all other agents' information. Consequently, for an agent to design centralized strategies based on the information of all peers in a large-population system is intractable. Alternatively, one reasonable and practical direction is to transform a high-dimensional and weakly-coupled problem to a low-dimensional and decoupled one, thus the complexity in both analysis and computation can be reduced. For this purpose, one method is to investigate relevant decentralized strategies based only on local information: that is, the relevant strategies are designed only upon the individual state of the given agent, together with some mass-effect quantities, which are computed off-line.
In this context, motivated by the theory of the propagation of chaos, Lasry and Lions [30, 31, 32] proposed distributed closed-loop strategies for each agent to solve the limiting problem, which were formulated as a coupled nonlinear forward-backward system consisting of a Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation and a Fokker-Planck equation. Moreover, the limiting problem enabled the design of approximate Nash equilibrium strategies. Independently, Caines, Huang and Malhamé [28] developed a similar program called the Nash certainty equivalence (NCE) principle, which was motivated by the analysis of large communications networks. In principle, the MFGs procedure consists of the following four main steps (see [5, 13, 25, 27, 32] ): (1) A limiting mass-effect term is introduced, which comes from the asymptotic mass-effect behavior when the agent number N tends to infinity. This limiting term should be treated as an exogenous and undetermined "frozen" term at this moment; (2) Through replacing the mass-effect term with the frozen limiting term, related limiting optimization problem can be introduced. Thus, the initial highly-coupled problem can be decoupled and only parameterized by this generic frozen limit. Subsequently, using standard control techniques (see [44] ), an HJB equation can be obtained because of the dynamic programming principle (DPP), or a Hamiltonian system can be obtained because of the stochastic maximum principle (SMP); the obtained equations can characterize the decentralized optimal strategies; (3) A consistency condition is established to guarantee that the set of decentralized optimal strategies collectively replicates the mass-effect; (4) the derived decentralized strategies are shown to be ε-Nash equilibrium, which justifies the aforementioned scheme for finding the approximate Nash equilibrium.
For further analysis details of MFGs, readers are referred to [1, 5, 13, 19, 25, 42, 43] . That substantial literatures exists studying linear-quadratic-Gaussian (LQG)-MFG is remarkable. For example, [26] studied LQG MFGs using the common Riccati equation approach; [8] adopted SMP with the help of adjoint equations; [2] and [33] studied ergodic LQG MFGs; [27] studied LQG MFGs with nonuniform agents through state-aggregation by empirical distribution. For further research, readers are referred to [3, 7, 41] and the references therein.
All aforementioned mentioned works examine standard MFGs, which (except [28] ) require that all the agents be statistically identical and that the individual influence on the overall population of a single agent be negligible as the number of the agents tends to infinity. However, in the real world, some models exist in which a major agent has a significant influence on other agents (called minor agents) no matter how numerous the minor-agents may be. Such interactions exists in numerous socio-economic problems (e.g., [29, 45] ). This type of games involving agents with different power levels is usually called a mixed type games. Compared with MFGs with only minor agents, a distinctive feature of mixed type MFGs is that the mean field behavior of the minor agents is affected by the major agent; thus, it is a random process, and the influence of the major agent on the minor agents is not negligible in the limiting problem. To deal with such new features, conditional distribution with respect to the major agent's information flow is introduced (see [37, 14] ).
We now discuss some works on MFGs with a major agent and minor agents that are related to our paper. To the best of our knowledge, the first LQG MFG with a major agent and minor agents was studied by [24] , in which the minor agents were from a total K classes. In the study of [38] , the authors examined mean-field LQG mixed games with continuum-parameterized minor agents. [37] investigated nonlinear stochastic dynamic systems with major and minor agents. [11] studied nonlinear stochastic differential games, involving a major agent and a large number of collectively acting minor agents, as two-person zero-sum stochastic differential games of the type feedback control against feedback control, the limiting behaviors of the saddle point controls were also studied. For further research, readers are referred to [4, 14] and the references therein.
In this study, we investigated a class of LQG MFGs with major agents and minor agents in the presence of control constraints. In all of the aforementioned papers about linear quadratic (LQ) control problems, the control was unconstrained, and the (feedback) control was constructed from DPP or SMP, which is automatically admissible. Whereas, if we impose constraints on the admissible control, the whole LQ approach fails to apply, (see e.g., [15, 23] ). We emphasizes that the LQ control problems with control constraints have wide applications in finance and economics. For example, the mean-variance problem with prohibiting short-selling can be transferred to LQ control problems with positive control, (see e.g., [6, 23] ). The optimal investment problems where the agents have relative performance, (i.e., their portfolio constraints take different forms), can also be tackled through approach of LQ control problems with input constraint, (see e.g, [20, 17] ). Remark 3.1 of the current paper provides several other constraint sets Γ ⊂ R m as well as their applications. For an investigation of LQ problems with positive controls or a more general study where the control is constrained in a given convex cone, readers are referred to [9] for a deterministic case and [15, 23, 34] for a stochastic case.
To the best of our knowledge, the current study is the first to examine constrained LQG MFGs with major agents and large numbers of minor agents. In addition to the control constraint being fully new, our study also has other novel features when compared with other relevant studies: in [24, 38] , the diffusion term simply takes a constant; however, this study considers the mean-field LQG mixed games in which the diffusion term depends on the major agent's and the minor agent's states, as well as the individual control strategy. This creates additional difficulties, especially when applying the general SMP; in [37, 11] , a nonlinear stochastic differential games was studied; however, in this study, we put ourselves in a LQ mean-field framework with individual controls constrained in a closed convex set; thus, we can explicitly present the optimal strategies through a projection operator. Moreover, we use SMP to obtain the optimal strategies through Hamiltonian systems that are fully coupled forward-backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs); this is different from [37] , which used DPP and a verification theorem to characterize the optimal strategies. Here, we connect the consistency condition to a new type of conditional mean field forward-backward stochastic differential equations (MF-FBSDEs) involving projection operators. We establish its well-posedness under suitable conditions using a fixed point theorem, both in local cases and global cases. Unlike our previous paper [21] , we now focus on the mixed game, which is more realistic and more difficult. In this situation, the consistency condition is a conditional MF-FBSDE that does not satisfy the usual monotonicity condition of [22] . Moreover, we require an additional subtle analysis to analyze the major agent's influence and establish the approximate Nash equilibrium. Finally, motivated by [17] , we believe that our results can be applied to solve the optimal investment problems caused by major agent and N minor agents.
The reminder of this paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, we formulate the LQG MFGs with a control constraint involving a major agent and minor agents. Decentralized strategies are derived through a FBSDE with projection operators. A consistency condition is also established using some fully coupled FBSDEs that come from the SMP. In Section 3, we prove the well-posedness of fully coupled conditional MF-FBSDEs, which characterize the consistency condition in the local time horizon case. In Section 4, we ascertain the wellposedness of the global time case. In Section 5, we verify the ε−Nash equilibrium of the decentralized strategies.
The main contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows:
• To introduce and analyze a new class of LQ mixed MFGs using SMP. In our setting, both the major agent and minor agents are constrained in their control inputs.
• The diffusion terms of major and minor agents are dependent on their states and control variables.
• The consistency condition system or NCE is represented through a new type of conditional mean-filed type FBSDE with projection operators.
• The existence and uniqueness of such an NCE system are established in a local case (i.e., small time horizon) using the contraction mapping method, and in a global case (i.e., arbitrary time horizon) using the discounting method.
Notations and terminology
Consider a finite time horizon [0, T ] for fixed T > 0. We assume (Ω, F, {F t } 0≤t≤T , P) is a complete, filtered probability space satisfying usual conditions and {W i (t), 0 ≤ i ≤ N } 0≤t≤T is a (N + 1)-dimensional Brownian motion on this space. Let F t be the natural filtration generated by {W i (s), 0 ≤ i ≤ N, 0 ≤ s ≤ t} and augmented by N P (the class of P-null sets of F). Let F
t } 0≤t≤T stands for the information of the major agent, while {F W i t } 0≤t≤T represents the individual information of i-th minor agent. Throughout the paper, x ′ denotes the transpose of a vector or a matrix x, S n denotes the set of symmetric n × n matrices with real elements. For a matrix M ∈ R n×d , we define the norm |M | := T r(M ′ M ). If M ∈ S n is positive (semi) definite, we write M > (≥)0. Let H be a given Hilbert space, the set of H-valued continuous functions is denoted by C(0, T ; H). If N (·) ∈ C(0, T ; S n ) and N (t) > (≥)0 for every t ∈ [0, T ], we say that N (·) is positive (semi) definite, which is denoted by N (·) > (≥)0. Now, for a given Hilbert space H and a filtration {G t } 0≤t≤T , we also introduce the following spaces which will be used in this paper:
LQG mixed games with control constraint
We consider a linear-quadratic-Gaussian mixed mean-field game involving a major agent A 0 and a heterogeneous large-population with N individual minor agents {A i : 1 ≤ i ≤ N }. Unlike other works of LQG mixed games, our control domain is constrained in a closed convex set of the full Euclidean space, and more details of constraints will be given later. The states x 0 for major agent A 0 and x i for each minor agent A i are modeled by the following controlled linear stochastic differential equations (SDEs) with mean-field coupling:
and
where
is the state-average of minor agents. Recalling that F i t is the individual decentralized information while F t is the centralized information driven by all Brownian motion components. We point out that the heterogeneous noise W i is specific for individual agent A i whereas x i (t) is adapted to F t instead of F i t due to the coupling state-average x (N ) . The coefficients of (1) and (2) are deterministic matrix-valued functions with appropriate dimensions. The number θ i is a parameter of agent A i to model a heterogeneous population of minor agents, for more explanations, see [24] . For sake of notations, in (2), we only set the coefficients A(·) and D(·) (see also R(·) in (4)) to be dependent on θ i . Similar analysis can be proceeded in case that all other coefficients depend also on θ i . In this paper, we assume that θ i takes values from a finite set Θ := {1, 2, . . . , K} which means that totally K types of minor agents are considered. We call A i a k-type minor agent if θ i = k ∈ Θ.
In this paper, we are interested in the asymptotic behavior as N tends to infinity which is essentially to consider a family of games with an increasing number of minor agents. To describe the related large population system, let us first define
where N k is the cardinality of index set
K ) is a probability vector to represent the empirical distribution of θ 1 , · · · , θ N . The following assumption gives some statistical properties for θ i . For more details, the reader is referred to [24] :
From (A1) we know that when N → +∞, the proportion of k-type agents becomes stable for each k and that the number of each type agents tends to infinity. Otherwise, the agents in given type with bounded size should be excluded from consideration when analyzing asymptotic behavior as N → +∞. Throughout the paper we make the convention that N is suitable large such that min 1≤k≤K N k ≥ 1. Now let us specify the admissible control set and cost functionals of our linear-quadraticGaussian mixed game with input control constraint. We call u 0 an admissible control for the major agent if u 0 ∈ U 0 ad , where
Here Γ 0 ⊂ R m is a nonempty closed convex set. Moreover, for each 1 ≤ i ≤ N , we also define decentralized admissible control u i for the minor agent A i as u i ∈ U i ad , where for a nonempty closed convex set [17] . Γ can also be some closed cone (i.e. Γ is closed and if u ∈ Γ, then αu ∈ Γ, for all α ≥ 0), e.g. Γ 3 = {u ∈ R m : Υu = 0} or Γ 4 = {u ∈ R m : Υu ≤ 0}, where Υ ∈ R n×m . For investigations on the stochastic LQ problems with conic control constraint, the readers are refereed to [15, 23] .
Let u = (u 0 , u 1 , · · · , u N ) be the set of strategies of all N + 1 agents, u −0 = (u 1 , u 2 , . . . , u N ) be the control strategies except A 0 and u −i = (u 0 , u 1 , · · · , u i−1 , u i+1 , · · · , u N ) be the set of strategies except the i-th agent A i . We introduce the cost functional of the major agent as
and the cost functional of the minor agent A i as
(4) We mention that for notational brevity, the time argument is suppressed in above equation as well as in the sequel when necessary.
We impose the following assumptions:
(A2) The coefficients of the states satisfy that, for 1 ≤ i ≤ N ,
(A3) The coefficients of cost functionals satisfy that, for 1 ≤ i ≤ N ,
Here L ∞ (0, T ; H) denotes the space of uniformly bounded functions mapping from [0, T ] to H. It follows that, under assumptions (A2) and (A3), the system (1) and (2) admits a unique solution x 0 , x i (·) ∈ L 2 F (Ω; C(0, T ; R n )) for given admissible control u 0 and u i . Now, let us formulate the LQG mixed games with control constraint.
We callū an optimal strategies set for Problem (CC).
For comparison, we present also the definition of ε-Nash equilibrium. 3.1 Stochastic optimal control problem of the major agent
As explained in introduction, the centralized optimization strategies to Problem (CC), are rather complicate and infeasible to be applied when the number of the agents tends to infinity. Alternatively, we investigate the decentralized strategies via the limiting problem with the help of frozen limiting state-average. To this end, we first figure out the representation of limiting process using heuristic arguments. Based on it, we can find the decentralized strategies by consistency condition, and then rigorously verify the derived strategies satisfy the approximate Nash equilibrium. We formalize the auxiliary limiting mixed game via the approximation of the average state x (N ) . Since π (N ) k ≈ π k for large N and
we may approximate
which is called the set of aggregate quantities. Replacing x (N ) of (1) and (3) by K k=1 π k m k , the major agent's dynamics is given by
and the limiting cost functional is
For simplicity, let ⊗ be the Kronecker product of two matrix (see [18] ) and we denote F 1,π 0 (5) and (6) become respectively to
We define the following auxiliary stochastic optimal control problem for major agent with infinite population:
Then u * 0 (·) is called a decentralized optimal control for Problem (LCC-Major). Now, similar to [21] , we would like to apply SMP to above limiting LQG problem (LCCMajor) with input constraint. We introduce the following first order adjoint equation:
as well as the Hamiltonian function
Since Γ 0 is a closed convex set, for optimal control u * 0 , related optimal state z * 0 and related solution (p * 0 , q * 0 ) to (8) , the SMP reads as the following local form
Similar to the argument in page 5 of [21] , using the well-known results of convex analysis (see Theorem 5.2 of [10] or Theorem 4.1 of [21] ), we obtain that (9) is equivalent to
is the projection mapping from R m to its closed convex subset Γ 0 under the norm
Finally, by substituting (10) in (7) and (8), we get the following Hamiltonian system for the major agent:
3.2 Stochastic optimal control problem for minor agent
Here, P Γ θ i [·] is the projection mapping from R m to its closed convex subset Γ θ i under the norm · R θ i . We mention that the limiting minor agent's state z i depends also on the limiting major agent's state z 0 , it makes that z i is F i -adapted, thus q i,0 dW 0 (t) appears in the adjoint equation.
Consistency condition system for mixed game
Let us first focus on the k-type minor agent. When
We would like to approximate x i by z i when N → +∞, thus m k should satisfy the consistency condition (noticing that Assumption (A1) implies that
Recall that for i, j ∈ I k , z i and z j are identically distributed, and conditional independent (under E(· |F W 0 · )). Thus by conditional strong law of large number, we have (the convergence is in the sense of almost surely, see e.g. [36] )
where z i is given by (13) with (11), (13) and (14), we get the following consistency condition system or Nash certainty equivalence principle of k-type minor agent, for 1 ≤ k ≤ K: (As mentioned before, for notational brevity, the time argument is suppressed in following equations except E(α k (t)|F
where α 0 satisfies the following FBSDE which is coupled with all k-type minor agents:
We consider together the major agent and all kinds of minor agents, i.e. (16) and (15) for all 1 ≤ k ≤ K, then there arise 2K +2 fully coupled equations including K +1 forward equations and K +1 backward equations. Such fully coupled equations are called consistency condition system. Once we can solve it, then
t ) which depends on the conditional distribution of α k , this allows us, in (15) , to use arbitrary Brownian motion W k which is independent of W 0 . Finally, let us introduce the following notation which will be used in the following sections
4 Existence and uniqueness of consistency condition system: local time horizon case
This section aims to establish the well-posedness of consistency condition system (15)- (16) in small time duration using the method of contraction mapping. Similar to the classical results on FBSDEs, see for example Chapter 1 Section 5 of Ma and Yong [35] , we need introduce the following additional assumption:
For simplicity, we denote
We have the following theorem:
, then there exists a T 0 > 0, such that for any T ∈ (0, T 0 ], the system (15)- (16) has a unique solution
Proof Let T 0 ∈ (0, 1] be undetermined and 0 < T ≤ T 0 . We denote
, we introduce the following norm:
Let
we solve respectively the following system including K + 1 SDEs, for 1 ≤ k ≤ K: 
Indeed, (20) is a n(K + 1)-dimensional SDE with the mean-field term
We can prove the well-posedness of such SDEs system by noticing E|E[α i (t)|F
by constructing a fixed point using the classical contraction mapping method, we omit the proof here. Now let us denote for 0 ≤ k ≤ K,
Thus by using 
where C ε is a constant independent of T , which may vary line by line. Adding up (21) and (22) for 1 ≤ k ≤ K, we have
and the Gronwall's inequality yields
Next, we solve the following BSDEs, for j = 1, 2,
Since (A2)-(A3) hold and α i , 0 ≤ i ≤ K have been solved from (20) , the classical result of BSDEs yields that (24) admits a unique solution
Thus we have defined a mapping through (20) and (24) T :
Similarly, we denotê
Applying Itô's formula to |β 0 (t)| 2 , and noticing
Substituting (23) into above inequality, we have
Similarly, by applying Itô's formula to
Noticing that ρ ∈ [0, 1], we have
where we have used the fact that
Thus, (26) yields that
Adding up (25) and (27) for 1 ≤ k ≤ K, we obtain (recall |D| 2 := max 0≤k≤K |D k | 2 and
The Gronwall's inequality yields that
Noticing that assumption (A4) holds, by first choosing ε > 0 small enough such that M 0 (|D| 2 + ε) + ε < 1, then choosing T > 0 small enough, we obtain from (28) that
for some 0 < δ < 1. This means that the mapping T :
By the contraction mapping theorem, there exists a unique fixed point
Moreover, classical BSDE theory allows us to show that
Let α k , 0 ≤ k ≤ K, be the corresponding solution of (20) . Then, one can obtain that the system (15)- (16) has a unique solution (18) holds.
Existence and uniqueness of consistency condition systemglobal time horizon case
The section aims to establish the well-posedness of consistency condition system (15)-(16) for arbitrary T , we first study one general kind of conditional mean-field forward-backward stochastic differential equations (MF-FBSDE) by using the discounting method of Pardoux and Tang [39] . Let (Ω, F, P) is a complete, filtered probability space satisfying usual conditions and {W i (t)
where the adapted processes X, Y, Z take their values in R n , R l and R l×(d+1) , respectively. The coefficients b, σ and f are defined on Ω×[0, T ]×R n ×R n ×R l ×R l×(d+1) , such that b(·, ·, x, m, y, z), σ(·, ·, x, m, y, z) and f (·, ·, x, m, y, z) are {F t }-progressively measurable processes, for all fixed (x, m, y, z) ∈ R n × R n × R l × R l×(d+1) . The coefficient g is defined on Ω × R n × R n and g(·, x, m) is F T -measurable, for all fixed (x, m) ∈ R n × R n . Moreover, the functions b, σ, f and g are continuous w.r.t. (x, m, y, z) ∈ R n × R n × R l × R l×(d+1) and satisfy the following assumptions:
(H 1 ) There exist λ 1 , λ 2 ∈ R and positive constants k 0 , k i , i = 1, 2, . . . , 12 such that for all t, x,
(H 2 ) It holds that
Remark 5.1 From the mean-field structure of (29) , sometimes the following conditions holds:
There exist λ 1 , k 1 ∈ R, such that for all t, y, z and process X 1 , X 2 , a.s.
For example, if b(t, x, m, y, z) = λ 1 x+ k 1 m+b 1 (y, z), then it obviously satisfies above assumption. Indeed, our mean-filed FBSDE satisfies this assumption.
Let H be an Euclidean space. Recall that L 2 F (0, T ; H), denotes the Hilbert space of H-valued {F s }-progressively measurable processes {u(s), s ∈ [0, T ]} such that
For λ ∈ R, we define an equivalent norm on L 2 F (0, T ; H):
. Now let us consider MF-FBSDE (29), its fully-coupled structure arises difficulties for establishing its wellposedness. Similar to [39] , when the coupling is weak enough, MF-FBSDE (29) should be solvable. The following is the main results on MF-FBSDE (29) and the proof is give in the appendix. 
, there exists a δ 1 > 0, which depends on k i , λ 1 , λ 2 , for i = 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12 and is independent of T , such that when
, there exists a unique adapted solution (X, Y, Z) to MF-FBSDE (29).

Remark 5.2 If in additional (H 1 ) − (i ′ ) holds (see Remark 5.1), by repeating the above discussion, one can show that if
, there exists a δ 1 > 0, which depends on k 1 , k i , λ 1 , λ 2 , for i = 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12 and is independent of T , such that when k 2 , k 3 , k 9 , k 10 ∈ [0, δ 1 ), there exists a unique adapted solution (X, Y, Z) to MF-FBSDE (29) . Now let us apply Theorem 5.1 to obtain the well-posedness of consistency condition system (15)- (16) 
Recall that
If we denote
Using above notations, the system (15)- (16) can be written as
Now let λ * be the largest eigenvalue of the symmetric matrix (30) with (29), one can check that the coefficients of Assumption (H 1 ) can be chosen as following
Thus by applying Theorem 5.1, we obtain the following global wellposedness of (30).
Theorem 5.2 Suppose that
then there exists a δ 1 > 0, which depends on λ * , 
and is independent of T , such that when
then there exists a δ 1 > 0, which depends on λ * , λ * 
ε-Nash Equilibrium for Problem (CC)
In Section 2, we characterized the decentralized strategies {ū i t , 0 ≤ i ≤ N } of Problem (CC) through the auxiliary Problem (LCC) and consistency condition system. Now, we turn to verify the ε-Nash equilibrium of these decentralized strategies. Here, we proceed our verification based on the assumptions of local time horizon case (Section 4). Note that it can also be verified based on global horizon case (Section 5) without essential difficulties. For major agent A 0 and minor agent A i , the decentralized statesx 0 t andx i t are given respectively by
i and the processes (p 0 ,q 0 ,p i ,q i ) are solved by
(32) Here we recall that
and α k , 1 ≤ k ≤ K are given by (15) and (16) . We mention that (32) gives also the dynamics of the limiting state (x 0 ,x 1 , . . . ,x N ) and one can check easily that (x 0 ,p 0 ,q 0 ) = (α 0 , β 0 , γ 0 ). Now, we would like to show that forū
is an ε-Nash equilibrium of Problem (CC). Let us first present following several lemmas.
Lemma 6.1 Under (A1)-(A4), there exists a constant M independent of N , such that
Proof From Theorem 4.1, we know that on a small time interval the system of fully coupled FBSDE (15)- (16) 
Then, the classical results on FBSDEs yields that (32) also has a unique solution
(Indeed, FBSDEs (32) has a unique solution for arbitrary T by using the Theorem 2.1 of [21] and the results of [22, 40] ). Thus, SDEs system (31) has also a unique solution
is N -dimensional Brownian motion whose components are independent identically distributed, we have that for the k-type minor agents, under the conditional expectation E(·|F W 0 )), for each 1 ≤ k ≤ K, the processes (x i ,p i ,q i ), i ∈ I k , are independent identically distributed. We also note that for each 1
then the Lipschitz property of the projection onto the convex set yields that
Moreover, there exists a constant M independent of N which may very line by line in the following, such that for all
From (31), by using Burkholder-Davis-Gundy (BDG) inequality, it follows that for any t ∈ [0, T ],
and by Gronwall's inequality, we obtain
Similarly, from (31) again, we have
Then using (34), we get
Thus
By Gronwall's inequality, it is easy to obtain E sup
Then, substituting this estimate to (35) and using Gronwall's inequality once again, we have E sup 0≤t≤T x i (t) 2 ≤ M, for any 1 ≤ i ≤ N. By applying this estimate to (34), we get
We complete the proof. Now, we recall that
then we have
Proof For each fixed 1 ≤ k ≤ K, we consider the k-type minor agents. We denotex (k) := 1 N k i∈I kx i . Let us add up N k states of all k-type minor agents and then divide by N k , we have
Recall
t ), and taking conditional expectation E(·|F W 0 t ) on the first equation of (15) and noticing that E(ϕ k (p i ,q i )|F
From (36) and (37), by denoting ∆ k (t) :=x (k) (t) − m k (t), we have
The inequality (x + y) 2 ≤ 2x 2 + 2y 2 and Cauchy-Schwartz inequality yield that
From BDG inequality, we obtain
Let us first focus on the second term of the right hand-side of (38) . Since for each fixed
s )), then µ does not depend on i and moreover we have
Then, due to the fact that (p i ,q i ), 1 ≤ i ≤ N are identically distributed, we obtain
where the last equality due to (33) . Now we focus on the third term of the right hand-side of (38), using (33), Lemma 6.1 and that (
Therefore, from above analysis, we get from (38) that
and Gronwall's inequality yields that
Sincȇ
by using (33), (39) and π
Finally, by using Gronwall's inequality, we complete the proof.
Lemma 6.3 Under the assumptions of (A1)-(A4), we have
Proof On the one hand, from both the first equation of (31) and (32), we have
The classical estimate for the SDE yields that
where M is a constant independent of N . Noticing Lemma 6.2, we obtain
On the other hand, from the second equation of (31) and the third equation of (32), we have that for 1
Noticing Lemma 6.2 and (40), we obtain E sup
Thus, considering also (40) we complete the proof. 
Proof Let us first consider the major agent. Recall (3), (6) and (17), we have
such estimates and Lemma 6.2, Lemma 6.3 as well as
we have
Similar argument allows us to show that
Thus, the proof for the major agent is completed by noticing (41) . Let us now focus on the minor agents, for 1 ≤ i ≤ N , recalling (4), (12) and (17), we have
From (33), we have E sup
6.2, 6.3, similar to the major agent, it follows that
Major agent's perturbation
In this subsection, we will prove that the control strategies set (ū 1 ,ū 2 , . . . ,ū N ) is an ε-Nash equilibrium of Problem (CC) for the major agent, i.e. ∃ ε = ε(N ) ≥ 0, lim
Let us consider that the major agent A 0 uses an alternative strategy u 0 and each minor agent A i uses the controlū i = ϕ θ i (p i ,q i ), where (p i ,q i ) are solved from (32) . Then the realized state system with major agent's perturbation is, for 1
The well-posedness of above SDEs system is easy to obtain. To prove (ū 0 ,ū 1 , . . . ,ū N ) is an ε-Nash equilibrium for the major agent, we need to show that for possible alternative control u 0 , inf u 0 ∈U 0
Then we only need to consider the perturbation u 0 ∈ U 0 ad such that J 0 (u 0 ,ū −0 ) ≤ J 0 (ū 0 ,ū −0 ). Thus, noticing Q 0 ≥ 0 and G 0 ≥ 0, from Lemma 6.4, we have
where M is a constant independent of N . Then similar to Lemma 6.1, we can show that
Lemma 6.5 Under the assumptions of (A1)-(A4), we have
Proof For each fixed 1 ≤ k ≤ K, we consider the k-type minor agents. We denote y (k) := 1 N k i∈I k y i . As there are N k minor agents of the k-type, let us add up their states and then divided by N k , it follows that
Recall (37) and if we denote∆ k (t) := y (k) (t) − m k (t), it follows that
Similar to the argument in the proof of Lemma 6.2, we can show that
Using (33), (43) and the fact that (y i (s),p i (s),q i (s)), i ∈ I k , are identically distributed, we have
Therefore, we get from (44) that
Similar to the proof of Lemma 6.2 again, and using (A1), we have for any t ∈ [0, T ],
Finally, Gronwall's inequality allows us to complete the proof. Now, we introduce the following system of the decentralized limiting state with the major's perturbation control, for 1 ≤ i ≤ N :
Lemma 6.6 Under the assumptions of (A1)-(A4), we have
Proof From both the first equation of (42) and (45), we obtain
With the help of classical estimates of SDE and Lemma 6.5, it is easy to obtain
Now, for any 1 ≤ i ≤ N , from both the second equation of (42) and (45), we get
The classical estimates of SDE, Lemma 6.5 and (46) allow us to complete the proof.
Lemma 6.7 Under (A1)-(A4), for the major agent's perturbation control u 0 , we have
Proof Recall (3), (6) and (17), we have
(47) Similar to Lemma 6.4, by using Lemmas 6.5, 6.6 and E |ȳ 0 (t)| 2 + |Φ(t)| 2 ≤ M , we have
The proof is completed by noticing (47).
Theorem 6.1 Under the assumptions of (A1)-(A4), then the strategies set
is an ε-Nash equilibrium of Problem (CC) for the major agent.
Proof Combining Lemma 6.4 and Lemma 6.7, we have
where the second inequality comes from the fact that
Minor agent's perturbation
Now, let us consider the following case: a given minor agent A i uses an alternative strategy u i ∈ U i ad , the major agent usesū 0 = ϕ 0 (p 0 ,q 0 ) while other minor agents A j use the control (32) . Then the realized state system with the minor agent's perturbation is, for 1
The well-posedness of above SDEs system is easily to obtain. Similar to the argument of major agent, to prove (ū 0 ,ū 1 , . . . ,ū N ) is an ε-Nash equilibrium for the minor agent, noticing Q ≥ 0, G ≥ 0, R θ i > 0 and Lemma 6.4, we only need to consider the perturbation u i ∈ U i ad satisfying
where M is a constant independent of N . Similar to Lemma 6.1, we can show that
We first present the following lemma Lemma 6.8 Under the assumptions of (A1)-(A4), we have
Proof We know that for each fixed i, there exists a unique 1 ≤k ≤ K, such that i ∈ Ik. Let us denote
We first consider the k-type minor agents, where k =k. Adding up their states and then divided by N k , we have for k =k,
Similar to the proof of Lemma 6.2, for
Now let us focus on thek-type minor agents, we have
Recalling (37) and if we denote Ξ := l (k) − mk, it follows that
By Cauchy-Schwartz inequality and BDG inequality, we obtain that for any t ∈ [0, T ],
On the one hand, since for each fixed s ∈ [0, T ], under the conditional expectation E(·|F W 0 s ), the processes (p i (s),q i (s)), i ∈ Ik, are independent identically distributed. If we denote µ(s) = E(ϕk(p i (s),q i (s))|F W 0 s )), then µ does not depend on i. Moreover,
Then, due to (33) and the fact that (p i (s),q i (s)), i ∈ Ik, are independent identically distributed under E(·|F W 0 s ), similar to the proof of Lemma 6.2, we can obtain
On the other hand, due to (49) and (50), we get
Nk . Therefore, from above estimates, we get from (52) that, for any t ∈ [0, T ],
which yields, by using Gronwall's inequality, that
Consequently, noticing (51) and (53), we have for each 1
Since
then by (33), (54) and π
Finally, by using Gronwall's inequality, we complete the proof. Now, we introduce the following system of decentralized limiting state with the perturbation strategy of minor agent
(55) Lemma 6.9 Under the assumptions of (A1)-(A4), we have
Proof From both the first equation of (48) and (55), we obtain
With the help of classical estimates of SDE and Lemma 6.8, we have
Now, from both the second equation of (48) and (55), we obtain
From the classical estimates of SDE, Lemma 6.8 and (57), it is easy to obtain (56). 
Proof Recall (4), (12) and (17), we have
Similar to the proof of Lemma 6.4, by using Lemma 6.8, 6.9 and
The proof is completed by noticing (58).
Theorem 6.2
Under the assumptions of (A1)-(A4), (ū 0 ,ū 1 , · · · ,ū N ) is an ε-Nash equilibrium of Problem (CC) for minor agents.
Proof For each 1 ≤ i ≤ N , combining Lemma 6.4 and Lemma 6.10, we have
where the second inequality comes from the fact that J i (ū i ) = inf 
Appendix
We give this appendix to prove Theorem 5.1. The fully-coupled structure of MF-FBSDE (29) arises difficulties for establishing its wellposedness. Motivated by Pardoux and Tang [39] Theorem 3.1, we can establish the wellposedness of MF-FBSDE (29) for arbitrary time duration when it is weakly coupled. Let us first note that for a given (Y (·), Z(·)) ∈ L 2 F (0, T ; R m ) × L 2 F (0, T ; R m×(d+1) ), the forward equation in the MF-FBSDE (29) has a unique solution X(·) ∈ L 2 F (0, T ; R n ), thus we introduce a map M 1 : L 2 F (0, T ; R m ) × L 2 F (0, T ; R m×(d+1) ) → L 2 F (0, T ; R n ), through X(t) = x+ 
We mention that the wellposedness of (59) can be established by using the contraction mapping method under assumption (H 1 ), (H 2 ), although it has the term E[X s |F W 0 s ]. We omit the proof. Moreover, with the help of BDG inequality, it follows that E sup t∈[0,T ] |X(t)| 2 < ∞.
Lemma 7.1 Let X i be the solution of (59) corresponding to (Y i (·), , ∀s ∈ [0, T ], we have
Let t = T in (61) and noticing that e −λ 1 (T −s) ≤ 1 ∨ e −λ 1 T , ∀s ∈ [0, T ], thus
(65) In particular, if λ 1 > 0, we have
Similarly, for a given X(·) ∈ L 2 F (0, T ; R n ), the backward equation in the MF-FBSDE ( 
where λ 2 := −λ − 2λ 2 − (k 4 + k 5 )K 
prove the theorem, it is only need to show that M is a contraction mapping for some equivalent norm · λ . In fact, for ( 
